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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1983 was one of six sections enacted as the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871.1 Congress passed the statute during the post-Civil War Recon-
struction era. Despite the earlier enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, southern states were still reluctant to safeguard the newly-granted
rights of black citizens. In fact, many states passed "Black Codes" that
largely ignored the liberated status of blacks. The Ku Klux Klan itself
was often free to terrorize black citizens while law enforcement officials
* The author wishes to dedicate this Note to the memory of Carol Ann and
Donald Robert Wingenfeld.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 117 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981)) [hereinafter section 1983].
The Act provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
Section 1983.
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in many parts of the South did little to discourage, and often encouraged,
such activities. 2
The major purpose of section 1983 was to guarantee the protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It was intended by Congress to "interpose
the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights" in order to compensate for any lack of state and
local law enforcement in safeguarding Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
tees.3 In "throw[ing] open the doors of the United States courts" to those
wrongfully injured under the color of state law, "Congress clearly con-
ceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the
Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights.' 4
Although the enactment of section 1983 initially provided hope for
blacks and other citizens, the statute had little effect until the civil rights
movement of the 1960s. 5 A major reason for this ineffectiveness was the
narrow construction generally given by the Supreme Court during this
time to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.6 Likewise,
protection under the statute was only afforded to victims of direct state
action that stemmed from legislation which overtly deprived citizens of
constitutional rights.7
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
a state must provide a person with a fair opportunity to be heard before
the state can deprive him of a [life, liberty or property] right.8 However,
under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has allowed a state to
deprive a person of such rights without providing a predeprivation hear-
ing. The Court has recognized the need for summary seizure of property
without any predeprivation hearing when unwholesome food threatened
the public health,' when incompetent bank management threatened eco-
I See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244, 321-22 (1871); for a more detailed
review of the history of section 1983, see Note, Developments in the Law-Section
1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977) [hereinafter HARV. Note]; for
a more detailed treatment of the congressional debate surrounding enactment of
section 1983, see Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed
Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 540-60 (1985).
1 Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) (quoting Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
'457 U.S. at 504.
5 See Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1486 n.4 (1969) (U.S.C.A. notes only 19 decisions under section
1983 in its first 65 years). Monroe was the first time the Court evaluated the civil
remedy available under section 1983 after 80 years as law. Id. at 1487.
' See, e.g., The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (implicitly
rejecting the application of the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
7 See HARV. Note, supra note 2, at 1156-69 (discussing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's narrow scope, including the doctrine that section 1983 only reached con-
duct of state officials and not of private persons).
I "For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has
been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.'" Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223,
233 (1854)). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-67 (1970) (predeprivation
hearing required before terminating welfare benefits); Sniadich v. Family Fin.
Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (predeprivation hearing required unless situation
is extraordinary).
'North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).
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nomic harm10 and when mislabelled drugs threatened the consumer-at-
large."
The recognition by the Court that the procedural due process guarantee
of the Fourteenth Amendment is flexible and not subject to hard and fast
rules was formally developed in the decision of Mathews v. Eldridge.'2 In
fact, however, the Court has delivered variable, and often-times contra-
dictory, opinions in the area of procedural due process. In Fuentes v.
Shevin1 3 the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a state may
cure a wrongful deprivation by providing the injured party with an ad-
equate post-deprivation hearing.14 But, in 1974, just two years after
Fuentes, the Court greatly expanded the scope of allowable post-depri-
vation hearings. In Mitchell v. WT. Grant Co.,15 the Court upheld a Lou-
isiana statute which authorized summary prejudgment writs of
sequestration ordering the seizure and holding of property. 16 In essence,
the Court in Mitchell discounted the interests of a debtor in a predepri-
vation hearing which it had earlier recognized in Fuentes.'7 Louisiana's
interest in protecting creditors and preventing property waste, along with
its ability to rectify any resulting damage, was deemed sufficient to war-
rant no predeprivation hearing, and yet still satisfy procedural due proc-
ess.' 8
10 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947).
Ewing v. Mytinger & Castleberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-600 (1950).
12 424 U.S. 319 (1975). "Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). To determine what procedural protections
the Constitution requires in a particular case, the Mathews test weighed several
factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
13 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes involved a prejudgment replevin statute that
allowed creditors to obtain a writ to seize property in an ex parte hearing. Id. at
69. The Supreme Court held that the statute violated due process because the
debtor was not given a predeprivation hearing. Id. at 83-84. The Court announced
the general rule that a state must provide a predeprivation hearing before it can
take property unless there is an extraordinary situation in which "some valid
government interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after
the event." Id. at 82 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971)).
'1 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82. "This Court has not... embraced the general prop-
osition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone." Id. (quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972)).
15 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id. at 619.
' See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
II Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 618-19. "Here, the initial hardship to the debtor is
limited, the seller has a strong interest, the process proceeds under judicial su-
pervision and management, and the prevailing party is protected against all loss.
Our conclusion is that the Louisiana standards ... are constitutional." Id. But
see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (Court held
1991]
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The Supreme Court's changing position on procedural due process
rights also extends to its application of section 1983 in safeguarding
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Over the last thirty years, the Court
has decided a number of cases which illustrate an on-going struggle to
find the proper place for section 1983 in the federal court system and,
consequently, what ultimately qualifies as adequate procedural due proc-
ess within the context of the statute.
This note will examine the history of Court decisions involving section
1983 in order to provide the proper background for examining the Court's
most recent decision in Zinermon u. Burch,19 a case which itself has added
to an already confusing field of legal study. Within this historical back-
ground, however, the Court has actually provided many of the analytical
tools necessary to address and solve the theoretical and practical problems
presented by section 1983 in procedural due process jurisprudence today.
This note will endeavor to use these tools to construct a framework for
recognizing the proper scope of section 1983 in guaranteeing due process
protections. Finally, this note will examine the direction that the Supreme
Court may take in the future with regards to section 1983. Special at-
tention will be paid to the new composition of the Court, as well as to
the viewpoints of its individual members.
II. THE EFFECT OF MONROE V. PAPE ON SECTION 1983
The summary seizure exception recognized by the Supreme Court in
Mitchell involved circumstances in which the deprivation took place pur-
suant to authorized, established state procedures intended for the public
good.2 0 This was still a narrow exception to the Court's general require-
ment that states must provide predeprivation process under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 1
that garnishment of bank account could not be performed without prior hearing
because predeprivation safeguards were not adequate); see also Sniadich v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (wages could not be garnished without notice and
predeprivation hearing).
'9 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
20 Mitchell, 416 U.S. 600. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538-40 (1981), the
Court cited the following cases in which it had allowed summary seizure because
of the necessity for quick action by the state, or because of the impracticability
of providing such a hearing: Ewing v. Mytinger & Castleberry, Inc. 339 U.S. 594,
599-600 (1950) (seizure of misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245,
253-54 (1947) (appointing conservator of a bank); Bowles v. Winningham, 321
U.S. 503, 521 (1944) (fixing of rents during wartime); Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler,
280 U.S. 218, 223 (1930) (seizure of property of deserting husband to support his
wife and children); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928) (issuance
of execution against debtor stockholders of bank); Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94, 112 (1921) (pretrial attachment of property of nonresident as security forjudgment); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320
(1908) (seizure of diseased poultry in order to safeguard public health).
21 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) "(the
'root requirement' of the Due Process Clause" is "that an individual be given an
opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property inter-
est"; hearing required before termination of employment (emphasis in original)).
[Vol. 39:445
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It was not until after 1961 that a similar exception was recognized for
wrongful deprivations caused by unauthorized and random acts of state
officials where the state could provide adequate postdeprivation reme-
dies. 22 This change occurred with the 1961 Supreme Court decision, Mon-
roe v. Pape.23 In Monroe, the Court rejected the distinction between
authorized and unauthorized acts in section 1983 suits, holding that
either could support a cause of action.2 Although Monroe did not involve
a procedural due process issue per se,25 many lower courts later applied
the Court analysis in such a manner.26
Monroe's broad construction of section 1983's key phrase "under color
of any [state] law" to cover even acts by state officers committed without
state authorization provided new strength to the once-ineffective stat-
ute.27 Since the vast majority of civil rights violations are caused by
officers or officials who act contrary, not only to the Constitution, but also
to official state law or policy, the Court in Monroe reasoned that few
violations would be remedied by an interpretation of section 1983 which
reached only "official" deprivations.28 Instead, the Supreme Court ruled
that section 1983 was intended to include the conduct of government
officials acting without state approval and in contradiction to established
law, custom and practice. 2
9
In Monroe, the officers had no authority under state law to enter the
plaintiffs' home without a warrant, assault the occupants, and destroy
their property in the course of an illegal search. Their actions clearly
violated official state law and policy. In determining that section 1983
was intended to remedy such unauthorized violations, the Court freed
the statute from its prior narrow requirement that predeprivation vio-
22 See, e.g., Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280, 281 (3d Cir. 1973) (state prisoner
deprived of seven packages of cigarettes states cause of action under section 1983).
23 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
241d. at 184.
25 Monroe involved a Fourth Amendment claim of illegal search and seizure.
Id. at 169. The complaint in Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago policemen
broke into the plaintiffs' home and made them stand naked in their living room
while the policemen ransacked the house. Id.
26 See, e.g., Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1975) (conversion of
prisoner's radio); Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1975) (pris-
oner's ring not returned to prisoner after release from jail).
27 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187; see infra note 32 and accompanying text. Justice
Frankfurter argued instead for a limited construction of "under color of law" that
would include only acts that were actually authorized by state law or custom, id.
at 246 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), or for which the state refused to provide a
remedy. Id. at 242-43.
28 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. In many cases, there is "no quarrel
with the state laws on the books." Instead, the problem is the way those laws are
or are not implemented by state officials in their daily routine. Monroe, 365 U.S.
at 176.
21 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-85.
1991]
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lations had to stem from officially promulgated state law or policy.3
Strengthened by the Court's interpretation to impose federal civil liability
for any "misuse of state power" 31 that deprives a person of federally pro-
tected rights, regardless of the state's ability or willingness to redress
such wrongs, section 1983 claims rose dramatically following the 1961
Monroe decision .32
In Monroe, the Supreme Court also refused to require exhaustion of
state judicial remedies as a precondition for bringing suit under section
1983 .3 If a plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right, the existence
of a state remedy was irrelevant. 34 The Court interpreted the intent of
Congress in enacting section 1983 as providing a supplementary federal
cause of action for violations of rights committed under color of state
law.35
In the immediate aftermath of Monroe, the Court also resolved impor-
tant related issues regarding the statute's coverage in a manner that
likewise provided wider access to the federal court system. The Supreme
Court gave a broad reading to the concepts of state action and color of
state law,3 6 ruled that property as well as liberty interests were protected
by section 1983,' 7 and provided only limited immunities for individual
- See Henry Paul Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979 (1986); Marshall S. Shapo, Con-
stitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277
(1965); HARV. Note, supra note 2.
31 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classics, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941)).
32 The number of federal filings under section 1983 (excluding prisoner suits)
rose from 296 in 1961 to 13,168 in 1979. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, 222-23 (1979).
Between 1961 and 1979, the number of prisoners' suits rose from 218 to 11,195.
Id.
" The Court in Monroe emphatically stated: "It is no answer that the State
has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary
to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked." 365 U.S. at 183. See also Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506-16
(affirming the Monroe stance that, except for a few narrow exceptions, with few
exceptions, the exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to action under
section 1983).
' Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
31 See id. at 174-75. In an earlier decision, the Court established that inten-
tional conduct by state officials which violated the due process protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment was actionable in federal court regardless of the existence
of state remedies. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227
U.S. 278 (1913).
36 See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (holding that a
white plaintiff, who was denied service because she was in the company of a group
of blacks, could obtain redress under section 1983 by showing that the existence
of state-enforced segregationist policies motivated the defendant).
37 See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,552 (1972) (recognizing
that "rights in property are basic civil rights" protected by section 1983).
[Vol. 39:445
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss3/9
DUE PROCESS AFTER ZINERMON
defendants.38 Later, the Court re-affirmed its ruling in Monroe that ex-
haustion of state remedies was not required before a section 1983 action
could be commenced. 39 Combined with the Court's expansion of substan-
tive constitutional protections, 40 section 1983 become the statute of choice
for the litigation of constitutional tort actions.41
Nevertheless, in the years that followed the Monroe decision, legal
scholars began to appreciate its widespread ramifications. 4 2 The opening
of the federal courts to a flood of section 1983 actions raised practical and
theoretical concerns as to the proper use of the statute. For thirty years
since its watershed decision of Monroe, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts have struggled with the doctrinal, political and institu-
tional consequences of the resurrection of section 1983.
43
III. POST-MONROE EFFORTS TO LIMIT SECTION 1983
A. Monell v. New York Department of Social Services
Ironically, one of the Supreme Court's first reconsiderations of Monroe
and its impact on section 1983 actually expanded the scope of the statute's
reach. In Monell v. New York Department of Social Services,44 the Court
in 1978 overruled that part of Monroe which held that municipalities
were not subject to suit under section 1983.4' Based on a fresh look at
the legislative history of section 1983, the Court held that municipalities
were indeed proper defendants in section 1983 cases.4 6 Along with Monroe,
38 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-57 (1967) (holding that judges
are immune from liability stemming from unconstitutional acts committed within
their judicial discretion, and that police officers who make a false arrest are
likewise immune if the arrest was executed with good faith and probable cause),
modified, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
39 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing a substantive
right to reproductive freedom); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(recognizing substantive right to privacy).
41 See supra note 32.
42 See, e.g., Zagrans, supra note 2.
43 Up to the present time, the members of the Supreme Court have been and
are still deeply divided on the proper interpretation of what scope to give section
1983 in the federal court system. See supra text accompanying note 24; see infra
text accompanying notes 50, 81, 104, 152-54, and 175-79.
"436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell stands as a classic example of a municipal policy
which caused a constitutional violation. At issue in the case was an officially
promulgated city policy compelled pregnant municipal employees to take unpaid
leaves of absence before such leaves were medically necessary. Id. at 660-61.
Id. at 663. The Court in Monell found that the 42nd Congress intended to
include local government units among "persons" subject to section 1983 liability.
Id. at 690.
46 Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, 690.
1991]
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the Monell decision continued to transform section 1983 into a potent
remedy against state, and now local, government abuse of Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees.
4
1
Nevertheless, even though Monell generally expanded the reach of
section 1983, the Court placed limits on the interpretation of municipal
government liability that are very important for analysis and under-
standing of proposed constrictions on the overall reach of section 1983.
In Monell, the Court reasoned that cities and counties could be sued for
damages or for declaratory or injunctive relief only if "the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes" official govern-
ment policy.48 Local governments would not be liable for damages if the
official's act violated the governmental policies of the city or county.4
9
This reasoning is directly at odds with the Court's ruling in Monroe.
In fact, the Court in Monell adopts the very limitation on municipal
liability for section 1983 actions that Justice Frankfurter, in his Monroe
dissent, had advocated to be applied to all government-level liability.5"
In Monell, the Court made the distinction between authorized and un-
authorized conduct as the appropriate boundary for local government
liability,5 ' whereas the Monroe holding rejected that line as the proper
limit for liability.52 In subjecting local governments to a different standard
of liability, the Court was showing the first signs of inconsistency in its
determination of section 1983 liability.53
By also rejecting respondent superior liability,54 the Court in Monell
effectively limited section 1983 municipal liability to situations in which
the wrongful activity could be attributed to the employer rather than the
employee. In other words, the employer must be identified as the one who
promulgates the decisions and policies of the municipalities that were
followed by the employee. 55 The deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees must have "unquestionably involved official policy as the
moving force of the ... violation.."5 6 Without indicating whether it was
basing its conclusion on the existence of a state or local regulation, or on
an administrator's exercise of discretion, or on both, the Court in Monell
determined that the unconstitutional, mandatory maternity leaves forced
upon the plaintiffs were unquestionably a matter of official policy.5 7 The
47Monell, however, has been criticized by some for construing municipal lia-
bility too narrowly. Some jurists and scholars argue that section 1983 would be
more effective if the Supreme Court had allowed municipalities to be held liable
on a respondent superior theory. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 834-44 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
49 Id.
-Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 264 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51 Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
51 Monroe, 365 U.S. 167.
-3See infra note 138-39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47.
s5 Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
T Id. at 694.
r, See Cardace Cohn, Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Failure
to Act as Custom or Policy, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1225, 1229 (193).
[Vol. 39:445
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Court did say, however, that municipal policy could be inferred from the
acts of officials with delegated policy-making authority. 5 In addition,
activities by low-level employees acting pursuant to the customs of local
government may also implicate the government. However, the Monell
Court provided little clarification on the meaning of "custom" aside from
implying that liability may result from the control or direction of em-
ployees by a government employer, or from its failure to supervise them.5 9
Thus, after Monell, a local government may be implicated in a section
1983 action by showing a breach of duty by policy-making officials or by
persons acting through delegated authority. As will be discussed later in
this Note, the notion of when acts of government officials are authorized
has become the central focus of the Supreme Court in determining section
1983 liability.60 The Monell decision provides a framework that the Court
can use to determine when acts are authorized through the basic principle
that a [local] government may be liable under the statute only if it had
knowledge or constructive knowledge of its agent's wrongdoing.6 1 Ac-
cording to the Court in Monell, a municipality with such knowledge
"causes" the wrongdoing by ordering it, condoning it, or failing in its
duty to prevent or contain the wrongdoing.62 Knowledge may exist as a
sufficient catalyst for authority if the wrongful act was performed pur-
suant to express policies, 63 or if the act is committed by an official who
is part of the responsible government structure or to whom such authority
has been delegated.- Knowledge may also be imputed if low-level em-
ployees take action that the municipality had a responsibility to control
or supervise.
65
However, Monell leaves some gaps in its theory of municipal liability,
and ultimately, in providing an air-tight solution for determining section
1983 liability on all government levels. Beyond sketching basic principles,
the Court deferred to the lower courts the task of shaping the contours
of municipal liability. For example, the Court did not make clear who in
fact is a policymaking official, or when a policymaker has delegated his
authority to another. Even less clear are the parameters of "custom,"
under which a municipality may be liable for the acts of its low-level
employees. 6
- Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The Court stated that the execution of policy or
custom may be accomplished by "it's lawmakers or those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy." Id.
69 The Court noted that it had "appeared to decide" in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976) that, "the mere right to control without any control or direction having
been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to support
section 1983 liability." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 n.58.
o See infra text accompanying notes 167-70.
61Monell, 436 U.S. at 669. See also Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 818-24.
62Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
63 Id.
6d. at 694.
Id. at 691.
The Court in Monell found that an unconstitutional policy existed, and,
therefore, did not have to address "what the full contours of municipal liability
under Section 1983 may be." Id. at 695. Subsequent decisions have added little
19911
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B. Paul v. Davis
The Supreme Court's efforts to curtail the use of the Due Process Clause
as a tool for bringing common law tort actions under section 1983 actually
began with its widely-criticized decision of Paul v. Davis in 1976.6 Along
with the subsequent decisions of Ingraham v. Wright08 and Parratt v.
Taylor,6 the Court sought to limit section 1983 access to the federal courts
by promoting the availability of an adequate state tort remedy as a sat-
isfactory alternative. 70 Taken together, these cases provide the Court's
reasoning as to why the state remedy should control access to section
1983 actions. Such control ultimately is based not on the grounds that
all state remedies must be exhausted before a federal action under section
1983 can be pursued, a holding which would require overruling Monroe,
7
'
but rather that the state remedy itself provides all "that process which
is due.
72
to the Monell formulation, beyond reaffirming that the municipal policy must be
"the moving force of the constitutional violation." Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 326 (1981).
67 424 U.S. 693 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976). Unsympathetic critics
of Paul include David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90
HARv. L. REV. 293, 322-38 (1976); Mark Tushnet, The Constitutional Right to
One's Good Name: An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
64 Ky. L.J. 753 (1976); Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputation, Stigma, and Section
1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. 191 (1977).
66 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
451 U.S. 527 (1981) overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986) and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
70 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals
from being deprived by state action of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. State law often determines which interests
are protected "liberty" or "property". See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)
(transfer of state prisoner to mental hospital); Merchum v. Faro, 427 U.S. 215,
reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976) (transfer of state prisoner to maximum security
facility); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (dismissal of city policy officer);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (dismissal of teacher by state
university). In each of these cases, state law protected certain interests with a
tort remedy. Consequently, the presence of a state tort remedy may actually be
an implicit factor in determining the very existence of a constitutionally protected
right. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405 (1977); Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A
Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1983); Rodney A. Smolla, The
Re-Emergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price
of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982). But see Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137 (1979) (wrongful imprisonment of an innocent man for three days
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, even though a false imprisonment
claim is available under state law); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (reputation
alone is not a "liberty" or "property" interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, even though a state defamation action may lie).
7, See supra note 33. A holding that an adequate state remedy precludes section
1983 action where otherwise available would overrule the exhaustion doctrine
as stated under Monroe and Patsy.
72 This phrase was attributed to Professor Ward's "irrefutable definition of due
process." Justice Lewis Powell, Bernard J. Ward, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982).
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Although the Court's scholarship in Paul was subject to sharp criti-
cism, 73 the holding of Paul has not only survived, but has flourished. Its
influences continue to weigh heavily in the Court's due process juris-
prudence. 74 Paul presented an action for equitable and monetary relief
brought by a Louisville newspaper photographer (Edward Davis) against
the police chiefs of Louisville and Jefferson counties in Kentucky. Davis'
name and picture had been circulated among local merchants by the police
in a flyer that purported to identify "active shoplifters". 71 Although the
plaintiff had been arrested and charged with shoplifting, charges were
subsequently dropped. 6 Davis chose not to pursue available state tort
remedies, but instead brought suit in federal court under section 1983.
Davis claimed that the flyer branded him a criminal without the benefit
of a trial, depriving him of his reputation, and thereby depriving him of
"liberty or property" without due process of law.77
The Supreme Court ruled in Paul that mere defamation by state officials
was not a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest.' The Court
rejected the argument that any act by a state official which might give
rise to a state tort action necessarily implicated Fourteenth Amendment
rights.7 9 The Court also implied that the existence of a state remedy for
the resulting harm might avoid a due process violation.8 0
Led by Justice Rehnquist, the majority in Paul did not believe that
every common law tort committed by a state official would automatically
71 See supra note 67.
74 Paul provided the building block for the later decisions in Ingraham and
Parratt. See infra note 80.
71 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695 (1976).
76 Id. at 695-96.
7 Id. at 698.
71 Zagrans, supra note 2 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 712). But see Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (due process violation for police chief, acting
pursuant to a state statute, to post, without a prior hearing, a notice to all retail
liquor outlets that plaintiff was a habitual drinker not entitled to purchase liquor
for one year). The Court in Constantineau argued that if any traditionally rec-
ognized entitlement conferred by state law should be protected under the Four-
teenth Amendment, it is certainly the right to be free from unprivileged, false
defamation. Id. at 437.
79 Zagrans, supra note 2 at 516 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 701).
In Paul, the Court held for the first time that the Due Process Clause did
not protect an interest created by state law and protected from infringement by
a state remedy. From this position of the Court that no constitutional right exists
despite the state law remedy, it is not too distant to argue that no constitutional
right exists because of the state law remedy. In fact, Justice Stevens realized this
implication in his separate dissent in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977),
in which he suggested that Paul may have been correctly decided, but based upon
an incorrect premise:
Perhaps the Court will one day agree with Mr. Justice Brennan's appraisal
of the importance of the constitutional interest at stake [in Paul, 424 U.S.
at 720-23, 734 (dissenting opinion)], and nevertheless conclude that an
adequate state remedy may prevent every state-inflicted injury to a person's
reputation from violating [section 1983].
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 701-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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be transformed into a cause of action under section 1983 and the Due
Process Clause.81 Davis' complaint, Justice Rehnquist noted, would have
been "nothing more than a claim for defamation under state law" if it
would have implicated a private party rather than a public official.8 2
Justice Rehnquist believed the real issue is whether the Due Process
Clause "should ex proprio vigore extend to him [the plaintiff] a right to
be free of injury wherever the State may be characterized as the tortfea-
sor.' ' 13 According to Justice Rehnquist, all torts committed by state offi-
cials are not violations of the Due Process Clause, for such reasoning
would, in his words:
[M]ake of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever system may already be admin-
istered by the States. We have noted the "constitutional shoals"
that confront any attempt to derive from congressional civil
rights statutes a body of general federal tort law... ; a fortiori,
the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause cannot
be the source for such law.
4
Despite Justice Rehnquist's attempts to separate constitutional viola-
tions from common law tort infractions, the principal outcome of Paul is
its focus on adequacy of state remedies. As will be expanded upon later
in this Note, distinguishing between constitutional infractions and state
common law torts is viewed by many as dangerous and likely to cut into
substantive fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause.
8 5
In addition, excluding procedural due process guarantees as a source of
section 1983 actions without proper consideration of the adequacy of state
remedies runs the risk of deprivation of liberty or property interests
without sufficient available process provided at any court level. 8
In the final analysis, the result of Paul was not justified by the reason
Justice Rehnquist gave (i.e., that Kentucky law did not have to provide
constitutional protection to Davis' reputation), but rather by precisely
the opposite. Since Kentucky law did safeguard the reputation of Davis
with tort law remedies at the state level, Kentucky had not violated the
Due Process Clause. This distinction was to be elaborated upon by the
Court in its next major case in this area of the law.
11 Rodney Smolla, The Displacement of Federal due process Claims by State
Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982
U. ILL. L. REV. 831.
82 Paul, 424 U.S. at 698.
Id. at 701.
Id. (citing Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971) (emphasis
added)).
15 See infra notes 130-33, 149 and 172, and accompanying text.
s See infra text accompanying notes 134, 149.
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C. Ingraham v. Wright
Ingraham v. Wright87 was a class action brought on behalf of junior
high school students in Florida who, without notice or an opportunity for
prior hearing, were severely paddled by public school officials for alleged
disciplinary violations. The students claimed they had been denied liberty
interests without due process.8 The Supreme Court ruled that the state's
deprivation of the protected liberty interests of the students had not been
performed without due process of law since a postdeprivation damage
action under state law was available for excessive or unjustified corporal
punishment.
89
As was true in the facts of Paul, a state remedial scheme existed in
Ingraham which provided redress for the harm that formed the basis of
the alleged due process violation.90 The Court in Ingraham, however,
avoided the controversy surrounding its Paul decision. In contrast to the
ruling of Paul, rather than deny the existence of a constitutional issue
as a way of avoiding a section 1983 claim, the Court in Ingraham conceded
that the physical restraint and administration of corporal punishment to
a student constituted an invasion of a constitutional liberty interest by
the state which triggered appropriate analysis under the Due Process
Clause.9 1 Nevertheless, despite the existence of a recognized liberty in-
terest, the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of procedural due proc-
ess is satisfied by Florida's preservation of common law constraints and
remedies.92
Ingraham is important to the development of postdeprivation due proc-
ess for two reasons. First, unlike the reputation issue at stake in Paul,
(an interest lacking federal content, but created instead by state law),
87 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
81 The relevant state statute provided that corporal punishment be adminis-
tered only after consultation with the principal or teacher in charge of the school,
and punishment proscribed that was not "degrading or unduly severed." Id. at
655 n.6. A local school board regulation additionally specified:
... that the principal should determine the necessity for corporal punish-
ment, that the student should understand the seriousness of the offense and
the reason for the punishment, and that the punishment should be admin-
istered in the presence of another adult in circumstances not calculated to
hold the student up to shame or ridicule.
Id. at 656 n.7.89 Id. at 677. The Court also relied on "the common law privilege permitting
teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on children in their care" and,
to a lesser extent, on the availability of criminal penalties for malicious punish-
ment of school children. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674-77.
91 Florida's remedial structure included civil actions for damages if punishment
is excessive, as well as criminal sanctions if malice is shown. Id. at 677 n.45.
9' "It is fundamental that the state cannot hold and physically punish an in-
dividual except in accordance with due process of law." Id. at 674, (citing Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
92 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676-77 (1977).
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the liberty interest at stake in Ingraham (the right to be free of physical
restraint and punishment) is unquestionably constitutional. The decision
in Ingraham thus made it clear that state common law remedies could
serve as an adequate replacement for due process safeguards even when
constitutional rights in property or liberty are at stake. 93 Secondly, the
legal challenge in Ingraham, unlike Paul, did not concern an isolated
instance of misconduct by a few officials, but rather dealt with Florida's
entire school disciplinary system. Nevertheless, the Court in Ingraham
still reasoned that an entire state program that repeatedly and system-
atically placed school officials in a position where they could deprive
constitutional liberties if they acted unreasonably was nonetheless ef-
fectively outside the reach of section 1983 action as long as the state
included within such disciplinary program its own adequate remedial
structure.
94
This reasoning would come under attack in later Supreme Court cases.
Jurists such as Justice Blackmun now contend that such a state program
results in deprivations that are not unauthorized and not random, but
are intentional and rooted in a procedure sanctioned by state law itself.95
This kind of deprivation is arguably well within the Court's guidelines
13 Smolla, supra note 81 at 847. But see Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 695-96 (White,
J., dissenting) (a post-beating damage remedy merely provides compensation, but
cannot vitatiate the harm caused by the violation, which is "final and irreparable"
upon infliction). See also supra note 14.
4 Smolla, supra note 81 at 848 (citing 430 U.S. at 676-77). Oddly, Justice
Blackmun joined the majority opinion in Ingraham, a position directly in conflict
with his later stance in Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. 975. In Zinermon, he wrote that
postdeprivation remedies offered by the state are not all the process that can be
expected where the state has delegated broad, discretionary authority to its of-
ficials. Id. The Court in Ingraham cited Paul Monaghan's article on the effect of
state remedies in limiting section 1983 actions. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 679
n. 47; Monaghan, supra note 70. Monaghan had written that:
[Pirior hearings might well be dispensed with in many circumstances in
which the state's conduct, if not adequately justified, would constitute a
common-law tort. This would leave the injured party in precisely the same
posture as a common-law plaintiff, and this procedural consequence would
be quite harmonious with the substantive view that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment encompasses the same liberties as those protected by the common law.
Monaghan, supra note 70, at 431. But see supra note 93. The question of whether
postdeprivation remedies are adequate to make the plaintiff whole, however, can
also be appropriately addressed in terms of the hardship placed upon the plaintiff
while waiting for the remedy. In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1 (1978), for example, the Court found that predeprivation process was
necessary prior to termination of public utility service because the termination
of services for any appreciable period of time created an unduly severe hardship
on the recipient. See also Irene Marker Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: The
Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 91 (1978) (the postdepri-
vation due process concept should not be applied to interest in "liberty", but is
appropriate only for deprivations of property since property can be restored or
valued, making the plaintiff whole, whereas interest in "liberty", once taken, are
gone forever).
15 See infra note 163 and accompanying text; but see infra text accompanying
notes 147-49.
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under Monell for determining when conduct is authorized by the state.9 6
In addition, as a collateral attack on the holding in Ingraham, a post-
beating damage remedy merely provides compensation. Such remedies
are criticized as incapable of undoing the harm caused by the deprivation,
which is "final and irreparable" upon infliction.9 7
At the time its decision was announced, the holding in Ingraham was
consistent with the Court's general movement in procedural due process
cases toward initial deference to the states in establishing procedural
safeguards for the entitlements that they created.9 This movement, how-
ever, clashed with the Court's earlier decision in Monroe which had es-
tablished a broader scope for section 1983 actions and a greater role for
the federal courts in guaranteeing procedural due process. Consequently,
Ingraham placed federal law in a back-up role for guaranteeing due proc-
ess protections, a role which is still debated at the present time. This
movement toward deference to state procedures and remedies reached its
zenith with the Supreme Court's decision in Parratt v. Taylor29
IV. THE PARRATT DOCTRINE
A. Parratt v. Taylor
After Monroe, thousands of section 1983 actions were brought under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 A principle
theory subsequently developed to limit these federal court actions rea-
soned that not every injury to a person's life, liberty or property caused
by a government employee is a deprivation without due process of law.
Instead, some of these injuries are simply state torts that raise no federal
question under section 1983.101 As noted earlier, this theory had its ev-
See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
See supra note 93.
98 See, e.g., Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumshat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Professor Whitman has argued that state
decisionmakers be permitted to develop their own protections for civil liberties,
noting that the costs of federalizing all common law torts committed by state
officers would mean the replacement of common law processes with a process that
is less democratic and less flexible. Perhaps even more significant, there might
also be a loss of substantive contributions by state lawmakers in the creation and
maintenance of entitlements that would be accorded recognition as property and
liberty interests. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5,
30-40 (1979).
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
- See supra note 32.
101 Concurring in Monroe, Justice Harlan observed that "a deprivation of a
constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a vio-
lation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the
same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional
right." Monroe, 365 U.S. 167, at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring). Courts and scholars
have long struggled to distinguish the constitutional tort action, worthy of a
federal forum, from the common law tort action, which is couched in constitutional
terms simply because the defendant is a government actor. See, e.g., Whitman,
supra note 98, at 14-25; Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due
Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201 (1984).
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olutionary roots in the Court's earlier decisions in Paul and Ingraham.02
On the heels of these two cases, Parratt v. Taylor '0 3 become the Supreme
Court's most ambitious attempt yet to limit section 1983 actions. In Par-
ratt, the Court attempted to provide a clear, workable test for distin-
guishing due process violations remediable under section 1983 from
common law torts confined to state remedies. 0 4
Ironically, the injury in Parratt was rather insignificant. Bert Taylor,
an inmate at a Nebraska prison, brought a section 1983 suit to recover
$23.50 worth of hobby materials. 10 5 Taylor alleged that his mail-order
hobby kit was lost by two employees working in the prison mail center. 106
The Supreme Court took this case as an opportunity to consider "what
process is due a person when an employee of a state negligently takes
his property."10 7 In writing the Court's opinion, Justice Rehnquist con-
ceded that the state employee had acted under color of state law, thus
agreeing, at least superficially, with Monroe's broad definition of what
conduct fell "under color of state law."'08
The Court nevertheless upheld the taking of property without prede-
privation process as not falling under the scope of section 1983 liability,
reasoning that:
The [prior] justifications which we have found sufficient to up-
hold takings of property without any predeprivation process
are applicable to a situation such as the present one involving
a tortious loss of a prisoner's property as a result of a random
102 See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
103 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986) and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
14 Id. at 543-44.
105 Id. at 529. Taylor claimed that his property was negligently lost in violation
of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal court had jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1988) [hereinafter section 1343], which pro-
vides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:
... (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States.
Section 1343. Section 1343 contains no minimum dollar amount for federal ju-
risdiction. Id.
10i Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530. One of the employees was a civilian, the other an
inmate. The normal procedure for handling mail, which required that the ad-
dressee sign for the package upon its arrival, was not followed in this case. Id.
107 Id. at 537. The Supreme Court partially overruled Parratt in 1985, holding
that the "Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] is simply not im-
plicated by a negligent act of [a state] official causing unintended loss of or injury
to life, liberty or property." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1985).
108 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536. See also Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
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and unauthorized act by a state employee. In such a case, the
loss is not a result of some established state procedure and the
state cannot predict precisely when the loss will occur. It is
difficult to conceive of how the State could provide a meaningful
hearing before the deprivation takes place. The loss of property,
although attributable to the State as action under "color of
law," is in almost all cases beyond the control of the State.
Indeed, in most cases it is not only impracticable, but impos-
sible, to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation. 10 9
In Parratt, the Court drew a Monell-type distinction between the ran-
dom and unauthorized acts of the government employees who caused the
deprivation and the government entity itself 110 The government entity
had no notice that the deprivation would occur in a case such as Parratt
109 Id. at 541. For a list of prior justifications which Justice Rehnquist noted,
see supra note 20. The Court characterized plaintiff's suit as a claim of deprivation
of procedural, as opposed to substantive, due process. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537.
"In particular, we must decide whether the tort remedies which the state of
Nebraska provides as a means of redress for property deprivations satisfy the
requirements of procedural due process." Id. There is ample room for debate on
this point. The plaintiff alleged in his own pleading that "his property [had been]
negligently lost by prison officials in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment" and that he had "been deprived of property without due process of
law." Id. at 529. It is debatable whether his complaint was directed solely at the
failure to provide adequate procedures before the wrongful deprivation. The com-
plaint arguably is directed at the wrongfulness of the taking itself. See, e.g.,
Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 100 (1984). If the case had instead focused on the
deprivation of property, the issue then would not be whether a hearing was
feasible, but whether the processes in place for receipt and delivery of mail were
inadequate, and whether the inadequacy caused the deprivation. Parratt does not
bar a claim in which the "procedures themselves [were] inadequate." Parratt, 451
U.S. at 543.
110 The Court in Parratt actually distinguished between deprivations that occur
as a result of a "random and unauthorized act by a state employee" and those
that are "a result of some established state procedure" and thus within the control
of the state. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541. Many commentators have noted that this
distinction between the government and the government's official is a departure
from precedent regarding state action. See, e.g., Daniel L. Bruckett, Comment,
Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law Remedies: Curtailing the Federal Civil
Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right, 43 U. PiTr. L. REv. 1035 (1982);
Edward B. Foley, Note, Unauthorized Conduct of State Officials Under the Four-
teenth Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer and the Resurrection of Dead Doctrines, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 837 (1985). Both of these commentators contend that such a
holding, in which a state official is not acting on behalf of the state and is not
involving the state in unconstitutional activity whenever the official himself is
violating state law, would require overruling years of precedent beginning with
Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 283-84,
287 (1913). This case held that a state court decision as to the legality of the
challenged conduct under state law is not necessary before the conduct be con-
sidered state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Bruckett, supra at 1081-82; Foley, supra at 845-46. The distinction of Parratt is
also fundamentally at odds with the holding in Monroe that action "under color
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and thus could not conduct a hearing prior to the deprivation."' The
government's first possible chance to provide a hearing arose only after
the deprivation occurred."12 Therefore, the provision for a postdeprivation
hearing was all the process that could be expected of the state, and all
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could require." 3
In cases such as Parratt, there is no constitutional violation since all the
process that can be expected has been provided. There is instead merely
an infraction of state tort law by a state prison guard that can be remedied
in the state courts." 4 The Supreme Court in Parratt arrives at this con-
clusion by clarifying what constitutes the deprivation of a protected con-
stitutional interest." 5 The Court reasons that such deprivation is not
complete until accomplished without due process of law." 6
Under traditional due process analysis, an individual's procedural due
process rights are violated when he or she is denied the opportunity to
protect an interest in life, liberty or property before the government action
occurred which impaired that protected interest. 1 7 For example, when
the government interferes with a person's First Amendment right to
speak or associate, the violation occurs at the time of the interference,
regardless of the state's willingness to later pay damages to the wronged
individual."8 However, a procedural due process violation of the kind
which occurred in Parratt takes longer to be completed. If a state agent,
without the authority or duty to conduct a hearing, deprives an individual
of a constitutional liberty or property interest, this depriving action is
not the final action of the State. 19 The state or local government is given
an opportunity to provide due process following the deprivation. Only
when the government fails to so provide is due process then violated. 120
of law" includes action not authorized by the law. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184. Yet,
Parratt expressly found that the defendant's pleadings satisfied Monroe's color of
law requirement of section 1983. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536. However, it frequently
has been observed that Parratt, by excluding from federal court those deprivations
which were contrary to state law where an adequate remedy exists, actually comes
closer to adopting Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 235-36
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), in which he argued that only acts pursuant to state
law, custom, or usage should be considered to be under color of law. See infra text
accompanying notes 126-29.
"I Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 539.
:14 Id. at 544.
"5 Id. at 537, 543-44.
6 The Supreme Court also suggests that the burden on the federal courts could
have been somewhat relieved had Congress added a minimum dollar limitation
on section 1343, the predicate for federal court jurisdiction in this matter. Parratt,
451 U.S. at 529.
117 Exceptions to this rule were noted by the Court in its past decisions for
emergency or public health cases, specific replevin actions and for certain property
rights. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 538-40. See also supra notes 9-11, 20.
"s Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990).
"9 A hearing is just one example of the kind of due process the government
may be required to provide. See supra note 109.
120 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541.
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The ruling of Parratt, in effect, allows a postponement in providing nec-
essary process until an adequate postdeprivation state tort remedy is
made available. 1
21
Although Parratt has allayed the fears of some that "every alleged
injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under 'color
of law' would turn into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cog-
nizable under section 1983, '1122 Parratt has also generated enormous con-
troversy.123 The decision still appears to conflict with the ruling in Monroe
that the state remedy need not be sought before the federal remedy can
be invoked (i.e., the exhaustion theory). 24 The Court in Parratt also
avoided a direct conflict with the Monroe decision by holding that, since
process was ultimately provided by adequate state remedy, there was
essentially no constitutional violation, which is a prerequisite for any
section 1983 action. 12 5 The Court neither reached nor overruled Monroe.
It simply by-passed Monroe in holding that the state remedy provided all
the process that was due.
In fact, the reasoning behind the Parratt decision is similar to the
position taken by Justice Frankfurter in his Monroe dissent. However,
the Court in Parratt failed to expressly adopt Frankfurter's logic, choosing
instead to adopt (at least on paper) the Monroe majority's broad definition
of "under color of law."' 26 By contrast, Justice Frankfurter reached his
result by offering a different understanding of the term's meaning. He
reasoned that "all the evidence converges to the conclusion that Congress
by section 1983 created a civil liability enforceable in the federal courts
only in instances of injury for which redress was barred in the state courts
because some 'statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage' sanctioned
the grievance complained of."'1 27 In essence, unless there is some affirm-
ative state pronouncement or well-confirmed custom which caused the
deprivation, the depriving action would not be under color of law, and
thus would not be a proper subject for section 1983 action. 28
Justice Frankfurter's definition of "under color of law" covered only
those violations which were pursuant to an established state procedure.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 544. See also supra text accompanying note 84.
113 See Karen M. Blum, Applying the ParrattlHudson Doctrine: Defining the
Scope of the Logan-Established State Procedure Exception and Determining the
Adequacy of State Postdeprivation Remedies, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 695 (1986);
Monaghan, supra note 27; Gerald L. Neuman, Law Review Articles that Backfire,
21 U. M cH J.L. REF. 697, 703-09 (1988).
124 Although the Parratt Court recognized the distinction between the two types
of remedies, Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44, the Court did not discuss its upsetting
of Monroe. In fact, it re-affirmed Monroe's exhaustion theory two years later in
Patsy, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
122 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545-46.
126 Id. at 535. See also supra note 110.
127 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 237 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 246; see also Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658, 694-95 (1978).
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All other violations were not under section 1983 action because they did
not meet this definition. Parratt, on the other hand, left the broad Monroe
definition intact, but instead undercut the effect of Monroe by another
route. The Court defeated non-established procedure actions by altering
the definition of due process itself to account for postdeprivation state
remedies as adequate due process. Thus, the Parratt Court utilized a due
process analysis, rather than a "color of law" analysis, in order to avoid
overturning Monroe, while at the same time limiting the effect of Monroe
and the definition of section 1983 actions. 129
The concern with this alteration of due process analysis is that it creates
potential problems when the boundaries of substantive rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment are reached. Although postdeprivation remedies
may be adequate to redress deprivations of constitutionally protected
interests, they cannot "cure" the unconstitutional nature of an act which
itself amounts to a substantive, constitutional violation.3 0 For this rea-
son, Parratt should not be extended to conduct violating a substantive
constitutional right.' 3 ' However, by giving due process analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment such definition under Parratt, and by setting a
standard which states may meet by providing adequate tort remedies,
federal judges may nonetheless be tempted to prune their dockets of
pending section 1983 cases by manipulating the definition of constitu-
tional "liberty" and "property" interests. 3 2 If the courts were in fact to
extend Parratt to deprivations of substantive due process rights, such
action would remove from section 1983 any and all cases in which the
constitutional deprivation was unauthorized and an adequate state rem-
edy was available. 33
Despite the controversy surrounding Parratt, it has endured as the
benchmark case for controlling all section 1983 actions. The Parratt de-
cision also has an historical basis to properly limiting the scope of this
statute. In the Monroe opinion, after reviewing the legislative history of
section 1983, Justice Douglas concluded that Congress had "three main
aims" in passing the statute back in 1871: (1) to override invidiously
discriminatory state laws; (2) to provide a remedy when state law is
inadequate; and (3) to provide a federal remedy when the state remedy
is adequate in theory, but not in practice. '34
129 See Zagrans, supra note 2, at 518-25. Professor Zagrans argues that Parratt
is an ad hoc attempt to temper the broad construction of "under color of law"
which results in undermining the underlying due process right. Zagrans suggests
that a better approach would be to redefine "under color of law" in accord with
Justice Frankfurter's dissent. Id. See also supra note 110.
130 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 545-46 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
131 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
132 See generally Monaghan, supra note 70.
133 See Bruckett, supra note 110.
131 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Parratt to deny a procedural due proc-
ess claim under section 1983 because an adequate state remedy exists is
actually consistent with the aims stated by Justice Douglas in his Monroe
opinion. The state of Nebraska did not enact any invidiously discrimi-
natory laws that deprived Bert Taylor of his property. Likewise, the Court
found Nebraska law adequate to remedy the deprivation, and there was
no evidence or suspicion that the state law, although sufficient in theory,
would not be enforced in practice. 135 Consequently, Parratt ultimately
stands for the proposition that no section 1983 action is necessary where
a state has satisfactorily addressed the concerns which motivated Con-
gress to pass the federal statute in the first place.
B. Hudson v. Palmer
In their concurrences to the decision in Parratt, Justices Blackmun and
White suggested that the Court's holding was limited to random and
unauthorized deprivations that were negligent, as opposed to inten-
tional. 13 6 In 1984, the Court rejected this contention in Hudson v. Pal-
mer,137 which involved a prison guard's intentional, unauthorized
"shakedown search" of plaintiffs prison cell. 38 The Court concluded that,
just as the state could not predict its officials' negligence, it could not
predict and provide a predeprivation hearing for the random and unau-
thorized, but nonetheless deliberate, conduct of its officials. 39 Parratt was
invoked by the Court in Hudson to bar the inmate's section 1983 claim
because of the availability of an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy
against the guard in the state courts. 40
C. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company
What remained after the decisions of Parratt and Hudson was still un-
certainty among the lower courts as to what exactly constituted random
and unauthorized conduct. Whether the Supreme Court considered ran-
131 See Harry S. Dannenberg, Comment, Parratt v. Taylor: Don't Make a Federal
Case Out of It, 63 B.U.L. REV. 1187, 1205 (1981) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541-
44).
136 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 545-46 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
The basis for the distinction was that states institute procedures to contain and
to direct deliberately inflicted harms. See also supra note 107.
137 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
"I' Id. at 520. The suit also alleged the shakedown search itself violated the
Fourth Amendment. That claim was rejected, however, because the Court held
that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a prison cell. Id. at
524.
119 Id. at 524.
141 Id. at 534-35.
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dom and unauthorized to be appropriately categorized under Monroe's
analysis of "under color of law" or under Parratt's adequacy of state
remedy analysis, the problem remained that the Court provided little
guidance in Parratt and Hudson as to how to proceed in distinguishing
between conduct that was or was not actionable under section 1983.
Nevertheless, the tools for at least a better understanding of what
constitutes random and unauthorized conduct are already available
through the Court's earlier decision of Monell. However, despite the ex-
istence of Monell's pronouncements on when a branch of local government
may be liable under section 1983,'1' the Court did not incorporate Monell
into its treatment of what constitutes random and unauthorized conduct
by state officials under Parratt and Hudson. Still, Monell can help to
understand the reach of Parratt and Hudson.142 In effect, Monell defines
those situations in which the deprivation is not random and unauthorized,
but rather is chargeable to a government entity.143 In contrast, Parratt
controls all other procedural due process claims which fail to state a
federal claim because the deprivation is chargeable not to the government
entity, but to the acts of its employees who are not authorized to provide
due process. 14
4
Following Parratt and Hudson, the Court's next decision helped to shed
further light on the surrounding confusion over what conduct could be
attributed to the state as actionable under section 1983. The Supreme
Court clarified and affirmed its Parratt decision one year later in Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Company. 45 In Logan, the Court explained that the
Parratt doctrine applies only in situations that require the state to act
quickly, or where it could not otherwise provide predeprivation process. 4 6
Distinguishing the loss in Parratt as resulting from random and unau-
thorized conduct, the property loss in Logan resulted instead from im-
proper "established state procedure" which destroyed a state-created en-
titlement without affording the wronged party any procedural safe-
guards. 4 7 The Court's refusal to allow Illinois to define its own state-
'4 See supra text accompanying notes 49-65.
1
42 A possible reason that Monell and Parratt have developed along separate
tracks is that the Court wished to give continued deference to Monroe while at
the same time circumventing by other means the 1961 decision which first rec-
ognized an expansive view of section 1983 liability for government actions. See
supra note 110 and text accompanying note 129.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
144Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 543 (1981).
14 455 U.S. 422 (1982). In Logan, the Zimmerman Brush Company discharged
the plaintiff purportedly because his left leg make it impossible for him to continue
as a shipping clerk. Logan brought his unlawful discharge complaint to the Illinois
Fair Employment Practices Commission. However, the Commission, apparently
through inadvertence, scheduled the necessary conference five days after the
expiration of the statutory limitation period for claims. Id.
146 Id. at 436.
141 In Logan, the Court said, "[u]nlike the complaint in Parratt, Logan is chal-
lenging not the Commissioner's error, but the 'established state procedure' that
destroys his entitlement without according him proper procedural safeguards."
Id. at 436.
[Vol. 39:445
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss3/9
DUE PROCESS AFTER ZINERMON
created "entitlement" so as to eliminate accompanying protections under
the Due Process Clause was also a marked reversal of a trend that had
evolved toward state supremacy in procedural due process cases. 148
When Parratt is read together with Logan, a tool emerges for under-
standing the distinction between state tort law actions and section 1983
violations. In addition to monitoring the propriety of the state established
procedure itself, the postdeprivation due process doctrine allows the states
to develop their own compensatory systems for the harms they inflict,
but preserves to the federal courts the power to intervene and provide
relief when state compensation proves inadequate.1 9 This is, after all,
the very goal that Justice Douglas sought in his majority opinion in
Monroe.150 Parratt and Logan forbid the frustration of attempts at full
compensation through superficial definitions of entitlements or phantom
procedural rules. If Parratt and Logan are applied correctly, federal courts
are freed from the burden of a caseload top-heavy with garden-variety,
"constitutionalized" tort cases, but still retain the critically important
power to intervene and override state procedures when it appears that
the state's compensatory system has failed in its essential due process
purpose.
However, as with Parratt, there has been some confusion in the lower
courts in applying Logan. Although often cited as delineating the bound-
aries of Parratt, interpretations of Logan have often blurred any hoped-
for borders. 151 Such difficulties in distinguishing between Logan's "estab-
14 Smolla, supra note 81, at 835. See Logan, 455 U.S. 422. See also supra note
98 and accompanying text. The Burger Court feared that an expansion of rec-
ognized entitlements created the risk that basic transactions by state and local
government would be deemed as involving liberty and property interests, and
that daily, routine activities of local government would eventually be subjected
to constitutional review (and the judicial system would then be inundated with
due process claims). The best-known case example of the Burger Court's effort to
cut-back on the recognition of entitlements, and instead to give deference to the
states in their creation of entitlements, was in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972). But see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (recognizing that
informal practices and customs may be sufficient to create a legitimate claim of
entitlement to a benefit).
14 State tort remedies could never oust federal courts of jurisdiction under
section 1983 for cases in which the federal claim is based on some constitutional
or statutory right other than the Due Process Clause, for that would turn the no-
exhaustion rule on its head. See Steven H. Hazelrigg, Note, Prisoner Property
Deprivations: Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 IND. L. J. 256, 275
(1976). Since the rationale of Parratt is that deprivations of property and liberty
interests are not made without due process when adequate postdeprivation relief
is available, the doctrine by its terms can apply only when the essence of the
alleged wrong is that some form of entitlement has been taken away unfairly.
Claims based on the First Amendment, on the Equal Protection Clause, or on
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment are completely
outside of the Parratt doctrine. See infra note 172.
151 See supra text accompanying note 134.
1 See, e.g., Cohen v. City of Philadelphia, 736 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984). The plaintiff complained that the Philadelphia Civil
Service Commission violated his right to due process by denying him back-pay
to which he was entitled. The Third Circuit found the procedure inadequate, but
held that the Commissioner's error was random and unauthorized because it
violated state law. Id. at 83-86.
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lished procedures" and what constitutes unauthorized conduct under Par-
ratt were illustrated by the Supreme Court itself in its most recent
decision in this area of the law.
V. ZINERMON AND ITS ATTACK ON THE PARRATT DOCTRINE
A. Zinermon and the Court's Opinion
The holding in Zinermon v. Burch1 2 sought to distinguish and limit
the reach of the Parratt decision. In Zinermon, the Court refused to apply
the Parratt doctrine to the claim of a state mental hospital patient who
alleged he was denied due process when admitted on a voluntary, con-
sensual basis, even though he was overtly incompetent, and should have
been afforded involuntary commitment procedures.,3 The Supreme Court
held that the conduct of the state hospital employees was actionable under
section 1983.154
According to Justice Blackmun, author of the majority opinion, Ziner-
mon was not controlled by Parratt for three reasons. First, the state could
not claim that the deprivation of the plaintiffs liberty was random. Any
erroneous deprivation would occur at a specific and predictable point in
the admission process at the hospital. 155 Second, unlike Parratt, where
the very nature of the deprivation made predeprivation process impos-
sible, 5 6 providing predeprivation process was not impossible in Zinermon.
In Zinermon, the state could have ensured predeprivation process by
limiting and guiding the state actor's power to admit patients. 157 Third,
and perhaps most important of all, "[the state employees] cannot char-
acterize their conduct as unauthorized in the sense the term is used in
Parratt and Hudson."158 In Zinermon, the state had delegated to its em-
12 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
153 Id. at 118-19.
154 Id. at 138.
115 Id. at 136. Compare this situation with the state's predicament in Parratt,
where it could anticipate that prison employees would occasionally lose property
through negligence. However, the state could not "predict precisely when the loss
will occur." Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541. Or, compare with the situation in Hudson,
where the state might be able to predict that guards occasionally will harass or
persecute prisoners, but "cannot know when such deprivations will occur." Hud-
son, 468 U.S. at 533.
156 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981). It would do no good for the state
to have a rule telling its employees not to lose mail by mistake. Id. In Hudson,
the errant employee himself could anticipate the deprivation since it was he who
intended to effect it, but the state itself still was not in a position to provide
predeprivation process, since it could not anticipate or control such random and
unauthorized intentional conduct. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533-34. Again, a rule
forbidding a prison guard from intentionally destroying an inmate's property
would do no good, and it would be ridiculous to hold a hearing to determine
whether a guard should engage in such conduct prior to the depriving act. Id.
"I Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 137 (1990).
118 Id. at 138.
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ployees at Florida State Hospital the power and authority to effect the
very deprivation complained of, and had also delegated the "concomitant
duty to initiate the procedural safeguards set up by state law to guard
against unlawful confinement."' 59
In writing the majority opinion in Zimmerman, Justice Blackmun re-
lied on an expansive view of what constitutes "under color of law" from
Monroe,160 and what constitutes "authority" under Monell. 61 Likewise,
the Court in Zinermon precluded Parratt's due process analysis under the
facts in Zinermon with its ruling that postdeprivation process was not
all the state could have provided in order to avoid a violation of plaintiff's
due process rights.
162
According to the Court in Zinermon, when the state has delegated
"broad power to admit patients ... to effect what, in the absence of in-
formed consent, is a substantial deprivation of liberty," the delegatee's
decisions made pursuant to his delegated authority are the authorized
acts of the government.16 3 Relying on Monroe, the Court reasoned that
"the deprivation here is 'unauthorized' only in the sense that it was not
on act sanctioned by state law, but, instead, was a 'deprivation of con-
stitutional rights ... by an official's abuse of his position." '1 Thus, the
fact that an official's action may be directly contrary to state law is not
controlling. According to the majority in Zinermon, the Parratt doctrine
is inapplicable unless the decision is unauthorized, and the action taken
by the hospital employees in Zinermon was with properly delegated au-
thority.165
The Court in Zinermon seems to stretch to the limit Monell's reasoning
of what constitutes the delegation of authority from a policymaker to
another. To be sure, the issue of when a government body or official
possesses delegated authority is not capable of a simple resolution, as
noted earlier in Monell.166 It is certainly clearest when a statute or other
159 Id.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 29, 36.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 60-62, 64.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
16, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 135 (1990).
161 Id. at 138 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1981)).
" Id. at 135. The Court stated:
It is immaterial whether the due process violation Burch [the plaintiff]
alleges is best described as arising from petitioners' [defendants'] failure to
comply with state procedures for admitting involuntary patients, or from
the absence of a specific requirement that petitioners determine whether a
patient is competent to consent to voluntary admission ..... He [Burch]
seeks to hold state officials accountable for their abuse of their broadly
delegated, uncircumscribed power to effect the deprivation at issue.
Id. at 135-36.
166 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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provision designates the body or official as the final authority ("policy-
making official") on a particular subject. 6 7 But, such is clearly not the
case with officials charged in Zinermon.
In an earlier Court opinion in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,168 the
Court provided no standards for determining when policymaking au-
thority is delegated in the absence of an express statute.169 Lacking clear
statutory authority on what constitutes delegated authority, Zinermon is
no different than the numerous and varied attempts of lower courts in
other cases to determine whether an official does or does not possess final,
discretionary authority. The uncertainty in the lower courts existed before
Zinermon and remains so in its wake.1
7 0
In considering what is properly delegated authority, it is important to
remember that the boundary between state court cases and those that
belong in federal court should be the boundary between isolated, low-
level wrongdoing and abuse of official power. If a state has abused its
official power and violated the Constitution, it should not be permitted
to choose whether to correct that abuse in its own courts. Placing the
federal court between the citizen and the abuses of the state goes to the
heart of both section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.'71
167 See, e.g., Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 480
U.S. 916 (1987). The Court found the county liable based on specific language in
the Michigan Constitution providing that the sheriff (the tortfeasor) had the
authority to make police policy for the county. Id. at 182. See also Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (Supreme Court decided that a county
prosecutor was a policymaking official).
161 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
11o Part IIB of the Pembaur opinion indicates that such authority may be del-
egated despite the absence of a statute, but does not clarify the standard for
determining when authority has been delegated. Id. at 483. In any case, Part IIB
failed to command a majority of the Court. Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined
the majority opinion, but did not join Part IIB. Id. at 491 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Id. at 491 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens indicated in his concurrence
that the opinion did not go far enough in defining the scope of municipal liability.
Id. at 487-91. He re-affirmed his position that the respondeat superior theory
should be incorporated into section 1983 jurisprudence. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at
487-91; see also supra note 47. Justice O'Connor's concurrence indicated that the
opinion went too far in defining the scope of municipal liability. Pembaur, 475
U.S. at 491 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She implied the state law alone should
define which officials are policymakers, and further argued that actions in vio-
lation of state law cannot constitute policy. Id. See also City of Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (Supreme Court holding that section 1983 liability
could not be based solely on police officer's actions in a fatal shooting without
further evidence of a municipal policy or custom).
170 Compare Rookard v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1983)
(officials had final, discretionary authority over significant matters based on their
titles and whether superiors would overrule their decisions) with Easter House
v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 783 (1991) (officials
had no policymaking authority despite their high-ranking titles since policy was
formulated by the state legislature and the commission's formal pronouncements).
'I See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
[Vol. 39:445
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss3/9
DUE PROCESS AFTER ZINERMON
As noted earlier, there is the danger that federal courts will lose sight
of the appropriate boundary between low-level tort infractions and con-
stitutional violations, and instead over-zealously apply the Parratt doc-
trine. This is certainly a great concern for Justice Blackmun in his
Zinermon opinion as he emphatically restated the kinds of section 1983
claims that must be protected in federal court under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of the available post-
deprivation remedy.172 However, informed of these categories of protected
claims, Parratt can serve as a useful tool for distinguishing serious abuses
of state power from common law tort claims. In his opinion for the majority
in Zinermon, Justice Blackmun seems to under-apply the Parratt doctrine
in holding that random wrongdoings of low-level employees in the state's
authority chain should be accountable under section 1983. Justice
O'Connor forcefully presents this argument in her dissent of Zinermon.17 3
B. O'Connor's Dissent
Similar to the Court's reasoning in Ingraham, Justice O'Connor con-
cedes that the plaintiff in Zinermon has suffered a serious deprivation of
liberty.174 Yet, Justice O'Connor contends there is no violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Zinermon since the state provides adequate
postdeprivation remedies for a deprivation that was random and unau-
thorized. 75 Simply put, the precedent of Parratt controls.176 In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor accused the majority of "transforming the allegations
into a challenge of the adequacy of Florida's admissions procedures" in
order to distinguish this case from Parratt.17
172 The Zinermon Court stated:
First, the [Due Process] Clause incorporates many of the specific protections
defined in the Bill of Rights. ... Second, the Due Process Clause contains
a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government
actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them." ... As to these two types of claims, the constitutional violation
actionable under section 1983 is complete when the wrongful action is taken.
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
Lastly, there is the guarantee of fair procedure. A section 1983 action may be
brought for a violation of procedural due process, but this violation is only com-
plete when the state fails to provide due process in the form of a state remedy.
Id.
173 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 139-51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
,14 Id. at 139. The majority in Zinermon in effect overruled the holding in
Ingraham which stood for the proposition that an entire state program that re-
peatedly and systematically placed school officials in a position where constitu-
tional liberties might be violated could nonetheless effectively withstand section
1983 action as long as the state included within the program its own adequate
remedial scheme. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
175 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 139 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176 Id.
17 Id. Plaintiff explicitly disavowed any challenge to the adequacy of Florida's
procedural safeguards on admissions to its state mental hospitals. Id. at 140.
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As noted by Justice O'Connor, "[clonsistent with [plaintiffs] disavowal
of any attack upon the adequacy of the State's established procedure,
Burch [the plaintiff] alleges that petitioners [state employees] flagrantly
and at least recklessly contravened those requirements. 178 Such depri-
vation of plaintiff s liberty must have stemmed from unauthorized actions
since flagrant and reckless acts of this sort by definition contravene state
law and established procedures, and could hardly be foreseen by the
state.
179
According to Justice O'Connor, plaintiffs case boils down to one of two
situations. Either the procedural safeguards established by the state are
adequate or they are not.180 If they are adequate, and in Zinermon the
procedures are not challenged by the plaintiff,18 1 then contravention of
these procedures is not foreseeable by the state. 18 2 The Parratt doctrine
stipulates that such a plaintiff has failed to state a claim allowing re-
covery under section 1983 when the random and unauthorized depriva-
tion is compensated by adequate postdeprivation state remedies. 8 3
If the established procedures are not adequate, then the state has not
done all that it can to guard against the deprivation. 8 4 Justice O'Connor
attacked the majority's stance that the state mental hospital employees
"possessed undue discretion [as] bound with, and more properly analyzed
as, an aspect of the adequacy of the State's procedural safeguards.' ' i 5 Her
line of reasoning falls precisely under the rationale of Logan. Plaintiffs
claim of a violation of procedural due process is actually on attack on the
adequacy of the state's procedural safeguards.8 6
In fact, Justice O'Connor contends in her closing remarks that if the
Court in Zinermon had correctly assessed the adequacy of the state pro-
cedures (under Logan) rather than considered the action based on the
state officials' random and unauthorized violation of the state law (under
Parratt) then the application of the traditional Mathews test'8 7 to the facts
in Zinermon "would perhaps have yielded a result favoring respondent
[plaintiff]". 8 8 The Mathews test, as applied here, was designed by the
Court to evaluate the competency of established procedures, such as the
voluntary admission process at the state hospital in Zinermon, and
whether additional safeguards would be of any value vis-a-vis any ad-
'7' Id. at 140-41.
17 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 141-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 147.
Isl d. at 141.
l" Id. at 142.
183 Id.
184 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 146 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 146.
's' The challenge is not to the state official's error, but to the "established state
procedure" that destroys a liberty interest without according the plaintiff proper
procedural safeguards. Logan, 455 U.S. at 436.
167 See supra note 12.
"I" Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 151 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ditional burdens placed upon the state when implemented.189 Instead, the
Court in Zinermon chose to avoid the proper application of the Mathews
test by ignoring the issue of the adequacy of established state procedures,
while at the same time still contending that the state had not done all
that it could, or as Justice O'Connor stated in her dissent, by "creating
the innovation which so disrupts established law."'190 Such avoidance was
taken despite the Court's recent application of the Mathews' test to a case
with strikingly similar circumstances to the facts in Zinermon.'9 '
Adequacy of state-established procedures is in fact a basic building-
block for the Parratt doctrine's distinction between deprivations that are
actionable under section 1983 and those that are not. As the Parratt Court
noted:
It seems to us that there is an important difference between a
challenge to an established state procedure as lacking in due
process and a [property] damage claim arising out of the mis-
conduct of state officers. In the former situation, the facts sat-
isfy the most literal reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition against "state" deprivations [of property]; in the
latter situation, however, even though there is action "under
color of' state law sufficient to bring the amendment into play,
the state action is not necessarily complete ... the existence
of an adequate state remedy to redress [property] damage in-
flicted by state officials avoids the conclusion that there has
been any constitutional deprivation [of property] without due
process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 1
92
Justice O'Connor simply cannot accept the Zinermon Court's logic that
the state has delegated authority to state officials to effect such a dep-
rivation.193 The issue whether the defendants possessed too much power
that could so readily be abused without proper safeguards simply goes to
the question of the overall adequacy of the state procedures. In the view
of Justice O'Connor, the Court has needlessly added an additional layer
of confusing procedural safeguards to the already sufficient guarantees
'19 Id. at 150.
190 Id.
191 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (the Court applied the Ma-
thews test rather than the approach suggested in Zinermon to evaluate the ad-
equacy of state procedures governing administration of antipsychotic drugs to
prisoners).
192 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d
1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (1976), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 932 (1978).
113 Plaintiff had no more delegated power to depart from admission procedures
than the guard in Hudson did when he exceeded the limits of his authority for
conducting a search of a prisoner's cell or the prison official in Parratt who wrong-
fully misdelivered mail by not following procedures. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 146
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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of Parratt, Logan and Mathews.194 The argument advanced by the Court
in Zinermon that the state has delegated uncircumscribed discretionary
authority merely distorts the already-established distinction between un-
authorized acts against established procedures and laws, covered by Par-
ratt, and credible attacks against inadequate state laws and procedures,
covered by Logan (and the Mathews' test for assessing the value of pro-
viding additional safeguards). 195
C. Confusion in the Lower Courts
Justice O'Connor warned that Zinermon's displacing of the certain tests
of Parratt, Mathews and Logan would only create further confusion over
the proper test in determining violations of section 1983.19 This is pre-
cisely what occurred shortly after the decision of Zinermon. Without clear
direction as to whether Parratt had been overruled, limited or left intact,
lower courts have applied their own varied interpretations.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in Caine v. Hardy197
that a physician's allegation that a public hospital suspended and later
terminated his staff privileges without procedural due process stated a
claim under section 1983, notwithstanding the availability of state post-
deprivation remedies. 198 The circuit court broadly applied the Zinermon
decision to restrict the Parratt doctrine "to cases where it truly is im-
possible for the state to provide predeprivation procedural due process
before a person unpredictably is deprived of his liberty or property
through the unauthorized conduct of a state actor."' 99
The circuit court held that the physician could have been afforded
adequate procedure before the suspension because there was no threat
to patient safety, which would have required immediate action. The action
by the state employees was not random since deprivation of staff privi-
leges would occur as the formal proceedings moved from the suspension
to the termination stage.20 0 Likewise, the action was not unauthorized
since, like Zinermon, the circuit court believed the state had delegated
194 "The Mathews test measures whether the state has sufficiently constrained
discretion in the usual case, while the Parratt doctrine requires the State to
provide a remedy for any wrongful abuse." Id. at 145. "State officials able to
formulate safeguards must discharge the duty to establish sufficient predepri-
vation procedures, as well as adequate postdeprivation remedies to provide process
in the event of wrongful departures from established state practice." Id. at 149
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 150; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975).
196 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 150-51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197 905 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1990).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 862.
2oo Id.
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the power to revoke staff privileges to the state officials at the hospital. 201
The dissent in Caine again shows the wide range of interpretations left
open in the wake of the Zinermon decision. Applying the Parratt doctrine
more forcefully than the majority opinion, the dissent distinguished the
facts in Caine from those in Zinermon. The dissent's understanding of
the Mathews' test and the Parratt doctrine suggested that the state had
done all that could be expected in providing both predeprivation process
and postdeprivation remedies for random and unauthorized conduct.
20 2
According to the dissent, there was no authorization in Caine for the
hospital officials since their "investigatory and judicial bias in imple-
menting the regulations" did not "flow from the regulations them-
selves. '20 3 The dissent was also quick to point out that plaintiff's own
complaint asserted a violation of procedural provisions in nearly every
paragraph.
204
In attempting to distinguish Zinermon from Caine, the dissent reasoned
that in Zinermon "the voluntary admission of the patient may have been
an abuse of judgment by the staff authorized to admit him [plaintiff-
Burch], but their exercise of judgment was specifically condoned by the
regulations. '2 5 The dissent argued that this was not the situation with
the state hospital employees in Caine.2 6 However, such a fine distinction
is difficult to discern on a case-by-case basis, and is ultimately the root
problem with Zinermon. Such analysis sidesteps the clearer and more
appropriate argument authored by Justice O'Connor in her Zinermon
dissent that the problem lies more with faulty state procedures that allow
employees to contravene established law.20 7 Regardless of whether the
state employees in both Caine and Zinermon were authorized by their
respective policymakers to perform the steps they in fact took, a clearer
test to determine section 1983 liability is whether such authorization was
granted without proper safeguards to guarantee compliance with state
law and policy.208 If so granted, then the state has not done all that it can
to ensure predeprivation process. And, as already noted, the Court in
Logan has provided that faulty government procedures which allow such
deprivations are actionable under section 1983.209
201 Id. In Zinermon, the state had delegated to its employees the power and
authority to effect the very deprivation complained of, and also possessed the
duty to initiate the procedural safeguards established by the state law to guard
against the unlawful deprivation. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 139.
202 Caine, 905 F.2d at 865 (Jones, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 867 (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287,
1292-93 (5th Cir. 1986)).
20
4 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 180-86.
208 The Mathews test ultimately determines whether the state has furnished
all the safeguards that can be expected. See supra note 12 and text accompanying
note 189.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
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In sharp contrast to Caine and the Fifth Circuit's majority opinion, the
en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in reconsidering
an earlier ruling in light of the recently-decided Zinermon case, reasoned
that Zinermon's limitation of the Parratt doctrine applies only when, by
statutory oversight, government officials are granted uncircumscribed
discretion that is correctable by additional procedural safeguards that
could eliminate predictable deprivations of liberty or property.2 10
In Easter House v. Felder,21' an Illinois adoption agency alleged that
high state officials conspired with the adoption agency's former executive
director to delay renewal of the agency's license.212 The circuit court rea-
soned that the Zinermon holding did not focus solely on the hospital
officials' delegated authority, but also on the uncircumscribed nature of
this authority to erroneously admit patients on a voluntary basis.213 This
statutory oversight, the lack of in-place procedures to prevent abuse of
such authority, was central to Zinermon, according to the circuit court. 21 4
In contrast, Illinois licensing procedures were adequate in circumscribing
such discretionary abuses. Rather, it was a blatant violation of these
procedures that placed the action within the meaning of the Parratt doc-
trine 215
The circuit court's interpretation of Zinermon's faulty, uncircumscribed
authority places it very close to Justice O'Connor's contention that es-
tablished procedures are the culprit. 216 In fact, there is no discernable
difference between the circuit court's preception of statutory oversight in
Zinermon and the Logan standard for identifying inadequate state pro-
cedures. Yet, the circuit court, in distinguishing between the facts in
Easter House and Zinermon,2 17 fails to apply the very same logic that
would result in recognizing the similarity between the facts in Zinermon
and Logan. The court in Easter House reasoned that the state employees'
conduct and consequent failure in Logan to perform their duty did not in
and of itself constitute "established state procedure. 2 18 Instead, the state
statute itself was deemed inadequate. 219 Yet, the circuit court viewed the
statutory oversight in Zinermon not as inadequate process. Instead, the
failure of the state officials' performance of duty itself constituted "es-
tablished state procedure. '220
210 Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1400-01 (7th Cir. 1990).
21 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990).
212 Id. at 1390-94.
2 3 Id. at 1400.
:14 Id. at 1401.
215 Id.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 184-86 and note 186.
217 Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1403-04.
Id.
219 Id. at 1404. But, when their power is uncircumscribed, such officials should
be held accountable for the abuse of their uncircumscribed power. In Parratt
terminology, the abuse of power is predictable since the officials were entrusted
with broad, discretionary authority (a "statutory oversight" in delegating such
broad authority when it turns out to be abused). Id. In effect, the officials were
authorized to do the things they did. Id. at 1401-02.220Id. at 1401-02.
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Philosophically, the majority opinion in Easter House clearly parallels
the wishes of Justice O'Connor and others to prevent section 1983 from
becoming a "font of tort law".22 ' The circuit court took note of the Supreme
Court's efforts at "avoiding the use of section 1983 as just another op-
portunity for parties to shop between state and federal forums.."222 The
court reasoned that Zinermon does not appear to alter this effort.223 With
little guidance provided by the Zinermon Court on how exactly to proceed,
the Seventh Circuit chose to "continue to believe that Parratt must be
read broadly. .". .. 224 In doing so, the court found a way to continue to
apply the Parratt doctrine.
Perhaps Judge Easterbrook best summarized the prevailing confusion.
In his concurrence to the majority opinion in Easter House, Judge Eas-
terbrook noted that Zinermon is outrightly inconsistent with Parratt,
although the Supreme Court failed to recognize any inconsistency at all.
25
If the Supreme Court had simply overruled the Parratt doctrine in its
Zinermon decision, then the majority in Easter House would not have had
the freedom to maintain its broad application of Parratt, and thereby side-
step any application of Zinermon.2 26 As it stands, however, the Supreme
Court gave no such clear direction for the lower courts. According to Judge
Easterbrook, the Zinermon decision only adds to "a line of precedent
already resembling the path of a drunken sailor. ."..227
VI. THE FUTURE OF PARRATT AND SECTION 1983 AFTER ZINERMON
Zinermon generated considerable confusion in just the few months after
its decision was announced. The Fifth Circuit court in Caine expressly
noted the Supreme Court's order to the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its
decision in Easter House. In its Caine decision, the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the facts in Easter House were "significantly analogous to the facts
alleged by Dr. Caine. '221 Yet, while the Caine court refused to apply the
Parratt doctrine, the Seventh Circuit sustained its earlier, pre-Zinermon
decision in Easter House, and again refused to limit the applicability of
Parratt.229
It is likely that the Supreme Court will again review Easter House in
light of the contradiction of that case to the Fifth Circuit's application of
Zinermon in Caine. However, there might be a new twist if and when the
221 See id. at 1404; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544. The circuit court seems to distin-
guish its facts from Zinermon in order to avoid a confrontation with the Supreme
Court's Zinermon holding. See infra text accompanying notes 222-24.
222 Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1404.
2 2
3 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 1408 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
226 Id.
227 Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1409 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
228 Caine, 905 F.2d at 862.
229 Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1390.
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Supreme Court moves to settle the confusion. With the addition of Justices
Souter and Thomas to the bench, 23 0 the mathematics of the Zinermon 4-
to-3 majority could very well be reduced to a dissenting role. 231 Any review
of Easter House and Caine will likely be performed by the O'Connor-lead
Zinermon minority.
232
The assumption that the Supreme Court will reconsider Zinermon is
strengthened by the forcefulness of Justice O'Connor's position in her
original dissent.233 The question most likely to be addressed is not whether
Zinermon will be overruled or isolated, but rather how the philosophy of
Parratt will be re-fortified to prevent making the Fourteenth Amendment
a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already
be administered by the states. ' 234 There are several avenues that an
O'Connor-lead majority might take.
At an extreme, the Court could go well beyond Parratt and severely
restrict the reach of section 1983 liability by tightening its interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such is the position advocated by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Paul where he sought to distinguish between clear-
cut constitutional infractions and simple, garden-variety state tort vio-
lations.235 However, this approach has dangers. As noted earlier in the
discussion of Paul, distinguishing between constitutional infractions and
simple tort violations is likely to conflict and perhaps cut into funda-
mental rights protected by the Bill of Rights and substantiative rights
derived from the Due Process Clause. 236 Also, excluding procedural due
process guarantees from the context of section 1983 actions without con-
sidering the adequacy of state remedies risks the deprivation of liberty
or property interests with no procedural safeguards provided at any court
level. 23
7
230 Justice Souter's nomination to the Supreme Court of the United State was
confirmed by the United States Senate on October 2, 1990. Richard L. Berke,
Senate Confirms Souter, 90 to 9, As Supreme Court's 115th Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1990, § A, at 1. Justice Thomas was confirmed on October 15, 1991. Richard
L. Berke, Justice Thomas Confirmed by U.S. Senate, N.Y. TIMES, October 16,
1991, § A, at 1.
231 For example, Justice Souter served as Attorney General for the State of
New Hampshire from 1976 to 1978, just prior to the Supreme Court decision on
Parratt. The acting Attorney General for New Hampshire at the time of the
Parratt decision, Gregory H. Smith, a close friend and colleague of Justice Souter,
was one of many state attorneys general to submit amici curiae briefs urging
reversal of the lower court decision and instatement of tougher restrictions on
section 1983 actions in federal court. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 528; see also A Retiring
Yankee Judge Aims to Hang His Shingle at a New Address: The Supreme Court,
PEOPLE MAGAZINE, Aug. 6, 1990, at 45.
22 See supra notes 174-95 and accompanying text.
23 See supra notes 174-95 and accompanying text; see also Justice Sandra D.
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from
the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981) (as an
Arizona appellate court judge, Justice O'Connor advocated the exhaustion of state
remedies as a prerequisite to bringing a section 1983 action).
' Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981).
' See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see also City of Columbus v. Leonard,
443 U.S. 905, 910-11 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 130-33, 149 and 172 and accompanying text
17 See supra text accompanying notes 134, 149.
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Although different than Justice Rehnquist's approach under Paul, a
second route the Court could travel would yield a similar effect in limiting
the scope of section 1983 actions. This approach would re-evaluate the
original intent of Congress when it enacted section 1983. According to
those favoring a strict construction of the statute, Congress did not seek
to punish an errant officer for the misuse or abuse of his power. Instead,
Congress' purpose was to prevent the enactment of discriminatory laws
by making those who promulgate such laws civilly liable to those whose
rights are violated by them.2 38 To determine whether a plaintiff has a
cause of action under section 1983, one would need to focus on the de-
priving act, not the status of the actor. The focal inquiry would be "under
color of what law" was the deprivation accomplished, for the illegal law
is the real target of section 1983. If such a law cannot be identified, if no
state law has authorized the defendant's actions, then there is no target
for section 1983 liability since the deprivation was not under color of law,
and a claim for relief under the statute consequently does not lie. 239
However, this approach to limiting section 1983 has the same dangers
as the approach of Justice Rehnquist. There is still no assurance of a
safety net at the state court level for actions that do not qualify for section
1983 litigation since the adequacy of state remedies would not be con-
sidered in determining whether a federal claim exists.240 In addition, it
is not entirely accurate that only the illegal law is the real target of
section 1983. If this were the case, it would be rather simple for any state
policymaker to avoid section 1983 liability by keeping the laws clean,
while at the same time covertly promoting any deprivation that he or
she saw fit. Such a loophole was in fact why the federal statute languished
in obscurity for so many years, and why the Court in Monroe took such
decisive action in the first place.2 1 To return to a pre-Monroe interpre-
tation of section 1983 would be to ignore the intent of Congress for the
statute as originally determined by Justice Douglas in his Monroe opin-
ion.242
As noted earlier, a re-construction of under color of law analysis, as
recommended by Justice Frankfuter in his Monroe dissent, does avoid
13 But see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (White, J., concurring). "It
should hardly need stating that, ordinarily, liability in damages for unconstitu-
tional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very desirable effect of deterring such
conduct. Indeed, this was precisely the proposition upon which section 1983 was
enacted." Id. at 442.
23 See Zagrans, supra note 2, at 559-60. For a good overview of the legislative
debates concerning enactment of section 1983, see generally Zagrans, supra note
2, at 540-60.
240 Justice Frankfurter, the sole dissenter in Monroe and lone advocate at that
time for a restrictive interpretation of "under color of state law" on the Supreme
Court, did not offer any mitigating consideration in his Monroe dissent to offset
the harshness for those who would be left without legal recourse for the harms
they might suffer. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 242-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
24I See supra text accompanying notes 5-7, 28.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 28, 134.
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the dangers from Paul of over-zealous application of the Parratt doctrine's
due process analysis. 243 It restricts section 1983 actions by reinterpreting
the statute rather than altering the meaning of what constitutes due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 244 As detailed in this Note,
however, such dangers are well-recognized and documented, 245 and Par-
ratt can be effectively restricted to liberty and property interests without
infringing upon hard-core constitutional rights derived from the Bill of
Rights or fundamental rights derived from the substantive component of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 48
Recognizing these dangers and boundaries, the new Supreme Court
might simply choose to tighten-up the application of Parratt by avoiding
the excesses of Paul, while still rejecting attempts like Zinermon to un-
dercut its authority. To accomplish this, the Court should first expressly
discard the exhaustion theory of Monroe (affirmed by Patsy in 1982).247
Instead, state remedies would have to be pursued when there is a dep-
rivation of a protected interest. The availability of a state remedy would
be the key indicator that the deprivation is not without due process.
Likewise, the Court's ruling in Zinermon would have to be overruled
as unnecessarily restricting and confusing Parratts definition of "random
and unauthorized" conduct. Instead, the heart of Parratt-its focus on
what the state knows or should know based on the procedures it has
established-should be restored in order to properly limit actionable sec-
tion 1983 cases.2 48
In the final analysis, it is likely that Zinermon will be recognized by
the Court's new majority as an unnecessary attempt to refine the outer
limits of the Parratt doctrine. Any new majority's focus on managing the
overwhelming number of section 1983 cases in the federal system will
likely supersede any interest in debating the finer points of distinguishing
between what is and is not "random and unauthorized" conduct. Simply
put, the Court will probably be more interested in getting what it con-
siders to be the basic tort cases back to the state courts where they belong.
Whether the Court does this by overruling Monroe, by restricting what
is "under color of law" to just legislative enactments, or by restoring
Parratt, the goal the new majority seeks is likely to be clear-to restrict
section 1983 liability and re-direct the flow of tort cases to the state court
system.
143See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
144 See supra text accompanying note 129.
14 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
246 See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
147 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
2 For a contrary view on the restoration of the Parratt doctrine in the wake
of the Zinermon decision, see Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v.
Burch, Federal Rights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape,
40 EMORY L.J. 1 (1991).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Parratt doctrine can work as an effective tool in reaching the proper
scope for section 1983 actions as originally intended by Congress. Properly
applied, Parratt provides that legitimate actions against the state are
litigated under the statute. Likewise, the doctrine ensures that lesser
torts committed randomly and without authority by state officials will
be remedied by adequate state measures.
The Parratt doctrine also seeks to guarantee that the state does all that
it can to provide predeprivation process. Within the framework of the
doctrine, other Supreme Court decisions are helpful in determining when
the state or local government authority has fallen short of providing such
process, and, therefore, faces section 1983 liability. Following the guide-
lines of Monell, if the [local] government has properly delegated authority
to one of its officials to act as if he or she were the government, then a
subsequent deprivation of a liberty or property interest without process
is actionable under section 1983. If such authority was not delegated,
then the Parratt doctrine provides that no section 1983 liability exists
for random deprivations if an adequate state remedy is provided. If the
delegation of authority has been made in a faulty manner, where the
government has failed to ensure proper safeguards in delegating such
authority, then the Logan holding provides for a section 1983 remedy to
an injured party since the established government procedure effectively
caused the deprivation.
The Mathews test is ultimately the measure of whether the state has
done all that it can to ensure adequate predeprivation process. This test
assesses the value of additional procedural safeguards that a government
can provide in light of the burdens it would cause, as well as the benefits
it would provide to potentially injured parties. Applying the facts from
Zinermon, if the Mathews test reveals that there indeed would be value
to providing additional procedural safeguards to limiting the discretion-
ary authority of state hospital employees when admitting patients on a
voluntary basis, then the failure on the part of the state to do so would
allow a section 1983 action for the injured party.
Absent clear evidence of delegated authority under the guidelines of
Monell, the facts of Zinermon fit better under the analysis of Logan and
the Parratt doctrine. By finding the facts of Zinermon to be inapplicable
to the Parratt doctrine, the Court has caused a considerable amount of
confusion among lower courts. In the final analysis, it is a less confusing
and more meaningful test to determine whether a state should have
provided better procedural safeguards (under the test of Mathews) than
to apply the analysis of Zinermon and attempt to identify properly del-
egated authority within a governmental bureaucracy. Whether appro-
priately delegated or not, a more critical issue to resolve in any potential
section 1983 litigation is whether the state has provided adequate pro-
cedural safeguards to ensure against any unnecessary predeprivations of
constitutionally protected liberty and property interests.
PAUL F. WINGENFELD
1991]
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
38https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss3/9
